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ABSTRACT
      This paper studies a growth model that is able to match several key facts of economic history.  For
thousands of years, the average standard of living seems to have risen very little, despite increases in the
level of technology and large increases in the level of the population.  Then, after thousands of years of little
change, the level of per capita consumption increased dramatically in less than two centuries.  Quantitative
analysis of the model highlights two factors central to understanding this history.  The first is a virtuous circle:
more people produce more ideas, which in turn makes additional population growth possible.  The second
is an improvement in institutions that promote innovation, such as property rights: the simulated economy
indicates that the single most important factor in the transition to modern growth has been the increase in
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1 Introduction
The past century has been marked by extremely rapid increases in standards
of living. Measured GDP per capita is perhaps ten times higher in the United
States today than 125 years earlier, and with a mismeasurement of growth
of one percentage point per year, the factor could easily be more than thirty.
Also remarkable is the relatively brief span of history during which this
rapid growth has occurred. Conservative estimates suggest that humans
were already distinguishable from other primates 1 million years ago. Imag-
ine placing a time line corresponding to this million year period along the
length of a football ﬁeld. On this time line, humans were hunters and gath-
erers until the agricultural revolution, perhaps 10,000 years ago — that is,
for the ﬁrst 99 yards of the ﬁeld. The height of the Roman empire occurs
only 7 inches from the rightmost goal line, and the Industrial Revolution
begins less than one inch from the ﬁeld’s end. Large, sustained increases in
standards of living, our working deﬁnition of an industrial revolution, have
occurred during a relatively short time — equivalent to the width of a golf
ball resting at the end of a football ﬁeld.
This paper combines an idea-based theory of growth in which people are
a key input into the production of new ideas with a model of endogenous
fertility and mortality in order to analyze these remarkable facts. The inter-
nal dynamics provided by the model are able to produce thousands of years
of virtually no sustained growth in standards of living despite increases in
both technology and population, followed by the emergence of rapid growth.
More generally the model matches the broad time series behavior of both
population and per capita consumption.
To match the population data exactly, however, the quantitative analysis
introduces two shocks. The ﬁrst shock is an improvement in property rights.
The fraction of output that is allocated to compensate inventive eﬀort is an
exogenous variable in this model. In an economy with a well-functioning
system of property rights, inventors are allowed to earn the returns fromGrowth Over the Very Long Run 2
their discoveries, either through some direct mechanism such as a prize or
through an alternative mechanism such as the monopoly rents that accrue to
the owner of a patent. Intellectual property rights are obviously important
in such a system, but so are more general kinds of property rights: a patent
is valuable only insofar as the owner is allowed to recoup one-time invention
costs through subsequent sales of some product. North and Thomas (1973),
Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), Jones (1988), and Mokyr (1990) suggest that
over the broad course of history, changes in such property rights have been a
fundamental determinant of economic growth. The second shock introduced
in the model is a temporary decline in the standard Solow (1956) measure
of total factor productivity, as might occur during times of war or famine.
Quantitative analysis of the model assigns a major role to changes in
property rights in explaining growth over the very long run. As one example,
the number of new ideas produced in a year rises by a factor of 110,000 in
the simulated economy between 25,000 B.C. and the 20th century. A factor
of 108 of this increase is due to the fact that the 20th century has a larger
population base from which inventors are drawn; a factor of 4 of this increase
is attributed to knowledge spillovers, i.e. to the notion that it is easier to
produce ideas today because of discoveries made in the past. The remaining
factor of 245 is assigned to an increase in the property rights variable, the
fraction of resources used to compensate inventive eﬀort.
This project builds on a number of recent studies of growth over the
very long run, including Lee (1988), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990),
Kremer (1993), Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997), Tamura (1998), Lucas (1998), Galor and Weil (1998), and Hansen
and Prescott (1998). Following Lee (1988) and Kremer (1993), the link
between population and the discovery of new ideas plays a critical role.1 As
in the human capital-driven models of Becker et al. (1990), Tamura (1998),
Lucas (1998), and Galor and Weil (1998), fertility behavior is governed by
utility maximization. Common to most of these papers and to this one is a
1This link has been emphasized by Simon (1986) and Romer (1990), among others.Growth Over the Very Long Run 3
Malthusian building block: a ﬁxed supply of land that generates decreasing
returns to scale when technology is held constant.
This paper diﬀers from the existing literature primarily in its emphasis
on quantitative theory, i.e. in providing a complete quantitative analysis of
the growth model. In addition, a few modeling diﬀerences will be highlighted
along the way, the most important being the role of property rights.
Was an industrial revolution inevitable? The diﬀerent papers that have
looked into this question reach, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explic-
itly, diﬀerent conclusions. On the one hand, in the models in most of the
papers mentioned above, especially Galor and Weil (1998) and Hansen and
Prescott (1998), the dynamics in place from the beginning of time suggest
that something like an industrial revolution was inevitable. On the other
hand, the model in Lucas (1998) explicitly requires an exogenous shock to
the rate of return to human capital accumulation in order to get the indus-
trial revolution going. From a theoretical standpoint, one might imagine
that this is an undesirable outcome, but from a historical standpoint —
which might emphasize the development of property rights and the advent
of science-based research — such a ﬁnding may be entirely appropriate.
The present paper is somewhere in between. Something like an indus-
trial revolution is inevitable in the model, at least for a range of parameter
values. However, the timing of this industrial revolution is quite sensitive to
the parameter values and the nature of the shocks. A counterfactual exper-
iment at the end of the paper suggests, for example, that absent the large
improvements in property rights measured to have occurred in the 20th cen-
tury, the Industrial Revolution would have been delayed by more than 300
years.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic model. Section 3 analyzes the model’s dynamics and discusses
how it generates a demographic transition. Section 4 presents a summary
of the facts the model should address, explains how parameter values are
obtained, and exhibits the basic simulation of the model. Section 5 con-Growth Over the Very Long Run 4
ducts the quantitative analysis. Section 6 discusses some of the results and
implications, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 People
We begin by describing an environment in which fertility is chosen in a
utility maximizing framework, in the tradition of Becker (1960), Razin and
Ben-Zion (1975), and Becker and Barro (1988). The economy consists of
Nt identical individuals, where t =0 ,1,2,... indexes time. Each individual
obtains utility from consumption ct and from the number of children bt
produced by the individual in period t, according to











where ˜ ct ≡ ct−¯ c and˜ bt ≡ bt−¯ b. The parameter ¯ c>0 denotes the subsistence
level of consumption in this economy, and the parameter ¯ b ≥ 0 is related to
the long-run rate of fertility, as we will see shortly.
We assume 0 <µ<1, 0 <γ<1, and 0 <η<1. These parameter
restrictions ensure that the elasticity of substitution between consumption ˜ c
and children ˜ b is always greater than one. This simple assumption will play
an important role in generating the demographic transition.2
Individuals are each endowed with one unit of labor per period, which
they can use to obtain consumption or to produce children. Let  t denote
the amount of time the individual spends working, and let wt denote the
wage earned per unit of time worked. The technology for producing children
is straightforward: each unit of time spent producing children leads to α>¯ b
births.




˜ b1−η . Then the elasticity of
substitution between ˜ c and ˜ b is given by
1+z
γ+ηz. It is constant when γ = η and takes the
usual value 1/γ.Growth Over the Very Long Run 5
The individual’s optimization problem at each time t is given by
max
ct,bt, t
u(ct − ¯ c,bt −¯ b)( 2 )
subject to
ct = wt t (3)
and
bt = α(1 −  t), (4)
taking wt as given. The fact that this optimization problem is static sim-
pliﬁes the analysis. This fact can be derived from a more general dynamic
optimization problem under two assumptions. First, we assume that utility
depends on the ﬂow of births rather than on the stock of children. Second,
we assume that the probability of death faced by an individual depends on
aggregate per capita consumption, which individuals take as given. With
these assumptions, the more standard dynamic optimization problem re-
duces to the sequence of static problems given above.
2.2 Production of the Consumption Good
The consumption good in this economy is produced using labor LY ,l a n dT,







t  t, (5)
where σ>0 and 0 <β<1, and  t is an exogenous productivity shock. This
production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale to the
rivalrous inputs labor and land, and therefore increasing returns to labor,
land, and knowledge taken together. As in Romer (1990), this assumption
reﬂects a key property possessed by knowledge. Knowledge is nonrivalrous
and can therefore be used at any scale of production without having to be
reinvented. The amount of land in this economy is ﬁxed and normalized so
that T =1 .Growth Over the Very Long Run 6
2.3 Dynamics: Production of Ideas and People
The dynamics of this economy arise from two sources. First, people today
produce knowledge that makes it easier to produce consumption goods in
the future. As above, At denotes the stock of ideas at the start of period t.
Therefore, ∆At+1 ≡ At+1−At is the number of new ideas discovered during





where LA is the number of people engaged in producing ideas and δ>0,
λ>0a n dφ<1 are assumed. The production of ideas is modeled very
much like the production of any other good. Just as a larger labor force
produces more widgets, a larger number of researchers produce more ideas.
As in Jones (1995), the parameter λ allows for diminishing returns to
increasing the number of researchers at a point in time, a way to capture
duplication in idea creation. The parameter φ allows the productivity of
research to be either an increasing (φ>0) or a decreasing (φ<0) function
of the stock of ideas that have been previously discovered.
The second source of dynamics in the model is demography. Between
two periods, the change in the population is equal to the number of births
minus the number of deaths:
∆Nt+1 = btNt − dtNt ≡ ntNt,N 0 > 0. (7)
The number of births per capita bt is determined by the fertility behavior of
individuals, discussed above. The mortality rate dt is assumed to be a func-
tion of the average level of per capita consumption relative to subsistence,
a useful summary measure of the technological capability of the economy
as well as a measure that likely reﬂects the sensitivity of the population to
disease and natural disasters. The mortality rate is given by
dt(ct/¯ c)=f(ct/¯ c − 1) + ¯ d, (8)Growth Over the Very Long Run 7
where f(·) is some decreasing function such that f(0) ≥ 1+α and f(∞)=0 .
As consumption rises, the mortality rate falls. As per capita consumption
falls to the subsistence level, everyone in the population dies. This character-
istic implicitly deﬁnes what we mean by subsistence. Notice also that ¯ d ≥ 0
denotes the mortality rate in an economy with inﬁnitely large consumption.
2.4 The Allocation of Labor and Factor Payments
Three fundamental factors of production exist in this economy: labor used
to produce goods, labor used to produce ideas, and land. As a simpliﬁ-
cation, we assume land is not owned by anyone; i.e. it is treated as an
external factor. Next, we deﬁne an exogenous variable πt ∈ [0,1] as the
fraction of total production of the consumption good that is paid to com-
pensate inventive eﬀort in period t. We think of πt as capturing one aspect
of the institutional structure of the economy: in some periods, the institu-
tions encourage the production of new ideas by devoting a large amount of
resources to this endeavor, while in others, the production of new ideas may
be discouraged by institutions that limit the extent to which inventors can
be compensated. Historically, such institutions have included support for
research from monarchs or patrons, prizes, and the awarding of temporary
monopoly power through patents. The relationship between this variable
and intellectual property rights is clear, but the relationship extends to
other property rights as well. For example, the value of a patent obviously
depends on the prevailing economic environment.
With this deﬁnition, payments to labor in the idea sector are
wAtLAt = πtYt, (9)
and payments to labor in the consumption sector are
wYtLYt=( 1− πt)Yt, (10)
where wA and wY are the wages paid per unit of labor in the two sectors.
These wages will be equated in equilibrium by the free ﬂow of labor between
the two sectors.Growth Over the Very Long Run 8
The resource constraint for labor in this economy is
LYt+ LAt = Lt ≡  tNt. (11)
2.5 Equilibrium
The setup of the economy is now complete and we can deﬁne the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition:A static equilibrium in this economy in period t is a collection
of allocations and prices (ct,  t,Y t,L t,L At,L Yt,b t,w t,w At,w Yt) such that,
given values of the state variables At, Nt, πt,a n d t, (i) the choice variables
ct, bt,a n d t solve the representative individual’s maximization problem,
(ii) people are indiﬀerent between spending their time producing goods and
ideas, i.e. wt = wAt = wYt, and (iii) the resource constraint (11) is satisﬁed.
Deﬁnition:A dynamic equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of
static equilibrium allocations for t =0 ,1,2,..., together with sequences
for {At,N t,d t,n t}∞
t=0, such that, given an exogenous sequence of shocks
{πt,  t}∞
t=0 and given the initial conditions A0 and N0, the evolution of the
economy satisﬁes the laws of motion in equations (6), (7), and (8) and the
constraints At ≥ 0a n dNt ≥ 0.
Solving for the equilibrium is straightforward. The individual’s maxi-







This says that an individual must be indiﬀerent at the optimum between
spending a little more time working and spending a little more time produc-
ing children.












Along a balanced growth path in this model, ˜ ct and wt will grow at the
same rate. The assumption that 0 <γ<1, then, is what allows this modelGrowth Over the Very Long Run 9
to exhibit a fertility transition, i.e. a situation in which fertility eventually
declines as the wage rate rises.
This can be seen formally by noting that equations (3) and (4) imply
a second relationship ct = wt(1 − bt/α). Substituting this expression for ct
into (13) one gets an implicit expression for ˜ bt as a function of the wage wt.
Diﬀerentiating this expression, the sign of d˜ b














The traditional income and substitution eﬀects are reﬂected in the second
term. As the wage goes up, the income eﬀect leads individuals to increase
both consumption and fertility. The substitution eﬀect, on the other hand,
leads people to substitute toward consumption and away from fertility: the
discovery of new ideas raises the productivity of labor at producing con-
sumption, but the technology for producing children is unchanged. If γ<1,
then the substitution eﬀect dominates, while if γ>1, the income eﬀect
dominates. As usual, if γ = 1, i.e. with log utility, these two eﬀects oﬀset.
A third eﬀect not traditionally present is reﬂected in the ﬁrst term: as the
wage rises, the subsistence consumption level which the consumer is required
to purchase gets cheaper, leading consumers to have more after-subsistence
income to spend on both more children and more consumption. This eﬀect
disappears as the wage gets large. The assumption that 0 <γ<1, then,
leads the subsistence eﬀect to dominate for small values of the wage and
the substitution eﬀect to dominate for large values of the wage, producing
one component of the demographic transition: fertility rises and then falls
as the wage rate rises.
The allocation of labor between the two sectors is even more straight-
forward. Deﬁne st = LAt/Lt as the fraction of the economy’s labor force
that works to produce new ideas. Equating wAt and wYt in equations (9)
and (10) leads immediately to
st = πt. (14)Growth Over the Very Long Run 10
That is, not only is πt the fraction of the economy’s output devoted to
compensate inventors, in equilibrium it is also the fraction of the economy’s
labor force devoted to searching for new ideas. The remaining fraction 1−πt
is engaged in producing goods.
Based on these conditions, the following proposition (proved in the ap-
pendix) establishes a simple condition under which an interior static equi-
librium exists and is unique.
Proposition:L e t at ≡ (1−πt)βAσ
t  t/N
1−β
t be a measure of productivity in
this economy. Assume this measure of productivity is suﬃciently large that
(¯ c/at)1/β < 1 −¯ b/α. Then, there exists a unique interior static equilibrium
 ∗(at), w∗(at), c∗(at), and b∗(at).
The technical condition in the proposition is needed for an interior so-
lution. In the case in which this condition is just violated, (¯ c/at)1/β =
1−¯ b/α =  ∗. The population is so large relative to the technology level that
diminishing returns to land reduces the wage leading to c∗ =¯ c and b∗ = ¯ b.
Given the mortality function in equation (8), everyone in the economy would
die in that period, and the population would be zero from then on.
3 Dynamics and Stability
To see how the static equilibrium evolves over time, we proceed as follows.
First, we shut down the shocks in the model: we assume for the moment that
πt = π ∈ (0,1) and  t =1f o ra l lt. Then, we characterize the equilibrium
along a steady-state balanced growth path. Finally, we explore the dynamics
and the stability properties of this path.
3.1 Balanced Growth
A balanced growth path is a situation in which all variables grow at constant
geometric rates (possibly zero). We will look for a balanced growth path
in which  , s, b,a n dd are constant. To characterize the balanced growth
path of this economy, begin with the production function for new ideas,Growth Over the Very Long Run 11










Along a balanced growth path, the left-hand-side of this equation is constant
by deﬁnition, so the right-hand-side must also be constant. Since   and s








where Gz is deﬁned as the gross growth rate of any variable z along a
balanced growth path, i.e. Gz ≡
zt+1
zt .
Since ct = wt t and wt = at/ 
1−β
t , consumption is given by ct = at 
β
t .
Also, note that at is proportional to Aσ
t /N
1−β
t . The constancy of   along a
balanced growth path then implies








where θ ≡ λσ
1−φ − (1 − β). As the ratio in this equation indicates, there is
a race in the model between technical progress and the diminishing returns
implied by a ﬁxed supply of land (holding the stock of ideas constant). The
assumption of θ>0, which we now make, ensures that this race can be won
by technical progress and makes sustained exponential growth in per capita
income possible.
The assumption of θ>0 implies that the model is characterized by
increasing returns to accumulable factors. For example, suppose that the
production of ideas is homogeneous of degree one, so that λ + φ =1 . I ti s
easy to show that θ>0 then requires σ +β>1. Recall that the nonrivalry
of ideas motivated the assumption of constant returns to land and labor
and increasing returns to land, labor, and ideas together — i.e. σ>0. We
require the stronger assumption that there are increasing returns to ideas
and labor, holding land constant. That is, the increasing returns implied by
nonrivalry must be suﬃciently strong.Growth Over the Very Long Run 12
As in several recent papers, the growth rate of per capita income and
consumption along the balanced growth path is proportional to the rate of
population growth. Notice that
∆Nt+1
Nt
= n(at)=b(at) − d(at), (18)
where we abuse notation somewhat in writing d(at)f o rd(c(at)/¯ c). In addi-
tion, b(at)=α(1 −  (at)), so that a constant   requires constant birth and
mortality rates along the balanced growth path. Under what condition will
these rates be constant? Recall that the ﬁrst order condition for the individ-
ual’s optimization problem in equation (13) leads her to set the excess birth
rate ˜ bt proportional to (˜ c
γ
t /wt)1/η. Therefore, we need ˜ c
γ
t /wt to be constant.
Along a balanced growth path, however, ct and wt grow at the same rate.
This implies that a balanced growth path occurs only asymptotically as ct
and wt go to inﬁnity, and the demographic transition eﬀects associated with
γ<1 apply. As this happens, ˜ bt approaches zero so that bt approaches ¯ b.
In addition, the mortality rate approaches ¯ d. We assume that ¯ b ≥ ¯ d so that
GN =1+¯ b − ¯ d ≥ 1. (19)
Applying this result to equation (17), we see that along the balanced
growth path,
Gc = Gw = Ga = GY/N =( 1+¯ b − ¯ d)θ. (20)
Notice that increasing returns is not suﬃcient for positive per capita growth
along the balanced growth path. If ¯ b = ¯ d, then there is no population growth
in the long run and the balanced growth path has zero per capita growth.
One must also be careful with the asymptotic nature of this result. The
balanced growth path in this model is an asymptotic result that applies only
as at goes to inﬁnity. For example, even if the balanced growth path has
zero (geometric) per capita growth, the growth rate of per capita income
will be positive in every period and the level of per capita income will go to
inﬁnity.Growth Over the Very Long Run 13












3.2 The Demographic Transition
A necessary prelude to characterizing the stability of the balanced growth
path and the nature of the transition dynamics of the model is an analysis
of population growth and the demographic transition. Recall that n(a)=
b(a) − d(a). We examine b(a)a n dd(a) in turn.
First, b(a)=α(1 −  (a)). From our discussion of b earlier, it should not
be surprising that b is a humped-shaped function of the wage, and hence of
productivity a. This pattern, and the implied  (a) schedule, are shown in
Figure 1.3 Also shown in this ﬁgure is a d(a) schedule; it is easy to show
3To be more precise,  (a) is the solution of the following nonlinear equation, obtained
by combining (25) and w = a/ 
1−β:





β − ¯ c)
γ 
1−β =0 .














where c = a (a)
β. The conditions that ˜ c>0a n d˜ b>0 limit the range of values that  (a)
can take to (¯ c/a)
1/β < <1 − ¯ b/α.W h e na = a
D ≡
¯ c
(1−¯ b/α)β , this range shrinks to the
single point at which   =( ¯ c/a
D)
1/β =1−¯ b/α. On the other hand, we have already shown
that lima→∞  (a)=1− ¯ b/α. These endpoint conditions, together with the conditions
on the slope given by equation (21) imply that the solution  (a) has the shape given in
Figure 1.Growth Over the Very Long Run 14







that c(a) is a monotonic function, so that d(a) has the same general shape
as d(c).
Finally, provided the function f(·) is restricted appropriately, we can
now characterize n(a) ≡ b(a) − d(a) as shown in Figure 2. The population
growth rate is zero when productivity is aM. It increases as a function of a
to a level greater than ¯ b− ¯ d (at least for a range of parameters values), and
then declines to its balanced growth path level as a goes to inﬁnity. The
demographic transition is apparent in both Figures 1 and 2.
This general picture describes the classic version of the demographic
transition. As summarized by Cohen (1995) and Easterlin (1996), the de-
mographic transition consists of two phases. In the ﬁrst, called a mortality
revolution, mortality rates fall sharply, driven by advances in health tech-
nology. Birth rates either remain relatively constant or perhaps even rise
slightly. The result is an increase in the population growth rate. The second
phase is the fertility revolution, characterized by a birth rate that now falls
more quickly than the relatively low but still declining mortality rate. The
result is a decline in the population growth rate.4
4The existing papers studying very long-run growth that have included a model of theGrowth Over the Very Long Run 15
3.3 Stability and Transition Dynamics
To analyze the stability properties of this economy, it is helpful to begin
with a simpler economy. Assume for this section that the production of new
ideas depends on πNt rather than on LAt = πLt. The appendix shows that
this simpliﬁcation does not change the qualitative nature of the transition
dynamics.
Consider two state-like variables, the productivity variable at and a sec-
ond variable xt ≡ δπλNλ
t /A
1−φ
t .T h a ti s ,xt i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fAt.T h e
dynamics of xt are given by
xt+1
xt
=( 1+n(at))λ/(1 + xt)1−φ. (22)
Since at =( 1− π)βAσ
t /N
1−β
t (again with  t = 1), the dynamics of this
state-like variable are given by
at+1
at
=( 1+xt)σ/(1 + n(at))1−β. (23)
In addition, x0 and a0 are given by the initial conditions on A0 and N0.F o r
interpretation, it is helpful to recall that ct is monotonically related to at.
These two equations, together with the static equilibrium conditions
that determine n(at), completely characterize the dynamics of the economy.
These dynamics can be examined in the discrete time version of a phase
diagram. Notice that the balanced growth path occurs when ∆xt =0a n d
at = ∞, so that the analysis of this system is slightly diﬀerent from the
traditional phase diagram analysis. Under the increasing returns assumption
that θ>0, the ∆xt = 0 schedule lies “above” the ∆at = 0 schedule, and
the dynamics are characterized as in Figure 3.
demographic transition — Becker et al. (1990), Tamura (1998), Lucas (1998), and Galor
and Weil (1998) — do so purely through a fertility transition that occurs as individuals
begin to trade oﬀ quantity for quality. The models are set up in an overlapping generations
context so that mortality is unaﬀected by technological progress. Galor and Weil (1996)
generate a demographic transition through a diﬀerence in the endowments of men and
women and a shift in comparative advantage. See Galor and Weil (1999) for an overview
of several diﬀerent theories of the demographic transition.Growth Over the Very Long Run 16













As drawn in the ﬁgure, the dynamics are quite rich. The balanced growth
path is globally stable: if the economy begins at any point such that at >
aD, it converges to the balanced growth path. However, we see that the
growth rate of At will not generally be monotonic along the transition to
the balanced growth path. It is natural to think of the economy starting
from a point with a low a — low consumption — and a low x —s l o w
technological progress. Then, the general pattern is for growth rates to rise
and then fall as the economy approaches the balanced growth path.
It is also easy to see the importance of the increasing returns assumption
that θ>0. If θ = 0, so that the economy is characterized by constant
returns to accumulable factors, then the ∆xt =0a n d∆ at = 0 curves lie
on top of each other. In this case, the dynamics of the economy move it
toward this curve, and the economy tends toward a situation in which at
and xt — and therefore per capita consumption — are constant.5 If θ<0,
the ∆at = 0 schedule lies “above” the ∆xt = 0 schedule. In this case, there
exists a globally stable steady state at the point at = aM. Population growth
(eventually) falls toward zero and consumption falls to some Malthusian-
style subsistence level. In both of these cases, technological progress occurs
5One has to be careful here. Because time is discrete, the economy could cycle around
such a point.Growth Over the Very Long Run 17
forever, and the population grows to inﬁnity. However, the key point is
that technological progress does not translate into growth in per capita
consumption, and the economy never experiences an industrial revolution.
In contrast to many endogenous growth models which emphasize con-
stant returns to accumulable factors, this model emphasizes the importance
of increasing returns to factors that can be accumulated (including labor).
The nonrivalry of ideas is an important feature in generating increasing re-
turns, but it is not suﬃcient, due to the presence of land as a ﬁxed factor.
For the model to generate the accelerating rate of population growth em-
phasized by Kremer (1993), and for it to generate an industrial revolution
endogenously, the nonrivalry of ideas must be suﬃciently strong so as to
overcome the diminishing returns implied by the ﬁxed supply of land.
Returning again to the θ>0 case, we are ready to consider what happens
if shocks are added back into the system. Both the level of x and the level
of a can jump as a result of shocks. A productivity shock that reduces  
causes a to decline. An increase in π causes the level of x to jump upward
and the level of a to fall. However, apart from these jumps, the dynamics
of the economy are still determined as in Figure 3.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of an exogenous increase in mortality, such as
the Black Death in 14th century Europe. Such a shock reduces N,c a u s i n ga
to jump to the right and x to jump down. The result is a rise in the level of
the wage and the level of consumption in the short run, and a reduction in
the rate of technological progress. As discussed by Lee (1988), population
and per capita consumption can be negatively related in the short run even
though they are positively related in the long run.
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 The “Facts”
The model developed in the previous section will be analyzed quantitatively
to help us understand growth over the very long run in both population andGrowth Over the Very Long Run 18
per capita income. First, however, we pause to present the “facts” about
these two variables.
Cohen (1995) assembles data on world population from a number of
studies conducted during the last forty years and provides a brief overview
of the data. McEvedy and Jones (1978), the main source used by Kremer
(1993), appears to be the most thorough study, and I will rely on Kremer’s
data, as reported in Table 1.
It is useful to appreciate both the extremely low rate of population
growth over most of history as well as the time scale over which this rate
operates. For example, using Kremer’s collection of world population data,
the rate of population growth, measured as the average annual change in
log population, was only 0.0000072 between 1 million B.C. and 1 A.D. Nev-
ertheless, over this period, the level of population increased by a factor of
1360: from 0.125 million people in 1 million B.C. to 170 million people in
1 A.D. A second key fact about population growth apparent in the table,
emphasized by Kremer (1993), is that the rate of population growth is itself
generally increasing over time. This is true not only in recent centuries but
also dating back to our earliest data.
Data on per capita GDP or per capita consumption are much harder
to come by. Nevertheless, the collection of evidence seems to support the
following stylized picture: there was relatively little net increase in standards
of living over most of history, say prior to the year 1500. Since then, per
capita growth has risen, and levels of per capita income are now substantially
higher than they were prior to 1500.
For example, Maddison (1982) estimates zero per capita income growth
in Europe between 500 and 1500. Lee (1980) ﬁnds that the real wage in
England in 1800 was nearly unchanged from its level in 1300; Hansen and
Prescott (1998) make use of some new data assembled by Gregory Clark to
reach a similar conclusion. Jevons (1896) uses detailed wage records from
Athens in 328 B.C. to argue that wages in ancient Greece were roughly theGrowth Over the Very Long Run 19
Table 1: Population Data
Population Average Annual
Level Growth Rate over


























Note: The levels of population are taken from Kremer (1993),
who in turn takes his data from various sources. The popu-
lation growth rate is computed as the average annual change
in the natural log of population over the preceding interval.
Two changes relative to Kremer are made. First, the year
1 A.D. is set equal to the year 0. Second, the population
in 1990 is used for the population in the year 2000. These
changes are made so that the period length in the model can
be set equal to 25 years. The growth rates for a few periods
are slightly diﬀerent from those in Kremer because he reports
growth rates from his underlying sources rather than based
on the levels themselves.Growth Over the Very Long Run 20
same as those in Britain in the 15th century.6 Schoenhof (1903) draws on
price schedules covering more than 1000 items compiled by Diocletian in the
year 302 A.D. to conclude that wages in ancient Rome were at least as high
as those in France in 1790.
Levels of world GDP per capita can be constructed from Tables 1 and
2 in Lucas (1998). Such calculations imply levels (in 1985 international
dollars) of $619 in 1750, $731 in 1850, $1764 in 1950, and $4257 in 1990.
Alternatively, Maddison (1995) reports an estimate of $565 (in 1990 dollars)
for the year 1500 and $5145 in 1992. DeLong (1998) reports values ranging
from $115 to $512 in 1500 and $5204 in 1990, depending on whether or not
an admittedly-coarse correction is made for quality change.
Growth rates of world per capita GDP can be also be computed from
these sources, and the results from Lucas and Maddison are in rough agree-
ment. According to the numbers from Lucas (1998), the average annual
growth rate was 0.17 percent from 1750 to 1850, 0.88 percent from 1850 to
1950, and 2.20 percent from 1950 to 1990. Using decadal averages, annual
world per capita GDP growth peaked in the 1960s at 3.10 percent per year
before falling to 2.12 percent in the 1970s and 1.31 percent in the 1980s.
4.2 Parameter Choices
To simulate the model, values for 19 parameters are required. We will ﬁx
some of the parameter values ahead of time and then estimate some others to
ﬁt the population data as well as possible. One issue that arises immediately
is the distinction between consumption and GDP. This distinction is not
present in the model, and we will choose for convenience to match up c in
the model with data on per capita GDP.
The parameter values that are ﬁxed in advance are summarized in Ta-
ble 2. The parameter ¯ c is set equal to 50, measured in 1990 dollars. If per
capita consumption were to fall to ¯ c = 50, everyone in the economy would
6Curiously, Clark (1940, p. 164ﬀ) takes this calculation further to argue that the same
statement is true of “modern” Britain, i.e. apparently in the 1920s or 1930s.Growth Over the Very Long Run 21
Table 2: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Value Comment
¯ c 50 Death with probability 1 at c =¯ c
N0 3.34 Population (in millions) in year 25000 B.C.
β 2/3 Land share = 1/3 (Kremer)
α 1/10 Maximum fertility rate per period
¯ b 0 Long-run fertility rate
¯ d 0 Long-run mortality rate
σ 1 Unidentiﬁed
A0 648.45 To produce n0 = 0 in 25000 B.C.
λ 3/4 Duplication of research
Period Length 25 Period length of 25 years
Note: Parameters of preferences and the birth and death technologies
are estimated to ﬁt birth and mortality rates, as described in the text.
die immediately. The parameter N0 is set equal to 3.34, corresponding to
the world population (in millions) in the year 25000 B.C., the ﬁrst year of
our simulation.
The parameter β is set equal to 2/3, so that the land share in an economy
with perfect competition and property rights would be 1/3. This is the value
chosen by Kremer (1993). The parameter α corresponds to the maximum
birth rate at any instant in time, and we set the value of this parameter to
1/10. Easterlin (1996) and Livi-Bacci (1997, p. 7) report that maximum
birth rates over history are about 0.05. With α =1 /10, this birth rate
occurs when one half of the individual’s labor endowment is devoted entirely
to raising children.
The parameters ¯ b and ¯ d correspond to the asymptotic birth rate and
mortality rate in the model (that is, as consumption goes to inﬁnity). How
many kids would people like to have when consumption is inﬁnite? We
assume ¯ b = 0, although one could make a case that this number should
be positive. We also assume that the mortality rate goes to zero, so thatGrowth Over the Very Long Run 22
people eventually can live forever. These assumptions imply that population
growth goes to zero as consumption gets large.
For the elasticity of output with respect to new ideas, we set σ =1 .
There always exists a value of φ consistent with any value of σ>0 such
that the model produces observationally equivalent results for population,
consumption, and total factor productivity Aσ. These two parameters could
be distinguished with data on the stock of ideas, but absent this data, they
cannot be distinguished. We set σ = 1 so that we measure ideas in units
of total factor productivity. The parameter φ, then, is conditional on this
value, and would change (in a predictable fashion) for other values of σ.
We assume a period length of 25 years, so that data on population are
only observed infrequently. The initial condition A0 is chosen so that the
population growth rate in the ﬁrst 25-year period is equal to 0, given all of
the values for the other parameters and assuming the initial value of π is
vanishingly small. This leads to a value of A0 = 648.45.
The ﬁnal assignment in Table 2 sets λ equal to 3/4. If the population
were instantaneously doubled, one suspects that the number of new ideas
discovered would increase by less than a factor of two because the same
idea would likely be discovered multiple times. This suggests an elasticity
less than one. Choosing a speciﬁc value for λ is more diﬃcult. Jones and
Williams (1999) suggest that a value of 3/4 seems reasonable based on esti-
mates of social rates of return. In the simulations below, this value produces
plausible results.
The remaining parameter values are estimated in two stages. First, we
estimate the parameters of the mortality function to ﬁt some very rough
statistics. Recall that the mortality function is given by
dt(zt)=f(zt)+¯ d, zt ≡ ct/¯ c − 1. (24)
We assume that f(z) is the reciprocal of a polynomial: f(z)=1 /(ω1zω2 +
ω3z). We then estimate the ωi parameters using nonlinear least squares to
ﬁt the observations given in Table 3. The last column of numbers in Table 3Growth Over the Very Long Run 23
Table 3: Observations on Mortality Rates
“Data” Fitted
Per capita Mortality Mortality
Consumption Rate Rate Comments
100 .053 .053
250 .05 .051 Livi-Bacci (1997)
800 .04 .038
2000 .02 .022 Cohen (1995) for 1950-55
5000 .01 .011 Cohen (1995) for 1985-90
20000 .007 .003 Canada, 1989
100000 .001 .001
Notes: The second and third data points are taken from rough guesses
by Livi-Bacci (1997) (p. 7) that average mortality rates range as high as
four to ﬁve percent and makes an educated guess that the mortality rate
averaged something like four percent between 1 A.D. and 1750. The con-
sumption numbers corresponding to these observations are simple guesses
that seem plausible given the analysis of Pritchett (1997) on minimum in-
come levels. The next two data points are taken from Cohen (1995, p.
68). Based on Maddison (1995), I assume that these years correspond to
per capita GDPs of 2000 and 5000 dollars. Finally, the last number cor-
responds to the mortality rate in Canada in 1989 according to the World
Bank (1991), Table 27. The mortality rate for the United States in that
year was slightly higher, at 0.9 percent, while in Japan, Hong Kong, and
Australia it was lower.Growth Over the Very Long Run 24







Table 5: Observations on Consumption and Population Growth
“Data” Fitted
Population Population
Per capita Growth Growth
Consumption Rate Rate Comment
250 0 -.0005
948 .008164 .0105 Year 1875–1900
2792 .020151 .0179 Year 1960–1970
4533 .018101 .0181 Year 1980–1990
20000 .007 .0077
50000 0 -.0004
reports the ﬁtted mortality rates; the coeﬃcients themselves are reported in
Table 4. The equation ﬁts quite well, with an R2 of 0.996.
Given the mortality function d(c), we turn to estimating the parameters
related to fertility. As with death rates, we have very little information
upon which to base our estimates of these parameters. The observations
we draw on are given in Table 5 and describe population growth and con-
sumption. The ﬁrst and the last two observations in this table are rough
guesses. Motivated in part by Pritchett (1997), we assume that the Malthu-Growth Over the Very Long Run 25







sian consumption level at which births and deaths are equalized is something
like two hundred ﬁfty dollars (in 1990 dollars). The next to last observa-
tion corresponds roughly to per capita income and population growth in the
richest countries today. The intermediate observations are taken from two
sources. The consumption levels correspond to the world per capita GDP
levels reported by Maddison (1995) in Table G-3.7 The population growth
rates, corresponding to the years reported in the comment, are taken from
Kremer (1993).
Given the mortality function d(c) that we have already estimated, and
given α = .10, we estimate µ, γ,and η to ﬁt the population growth rate data
in Table 5 as well as possible. Speciﬁcally, we estimate these parameters
using nonlinear least squares to minimize the sum of squared deviations
between the observed population growth rate and the model’s predicted
population growth rate at the given levels of consumption. The results
of this estimation are reported in Table 6. Figure 4 plots the birth and
mortality functions, together with the population growth rates that these
functions imply.
From the ﬁtted values in Table 5 and from the ﬁgures, one sees that this
simple fertility model performs well. The model generates a demographic
7Maddison does not report a value for 1875. I use the interpolated value from DeLong
(1998).Growth Over the Very Long Run 26
Figure 4: Birth Rates, Mortality Rates, and Population Growth
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Note: The circles indicate the data from Table 5.
transition and broadly matches the features of the data.
4.3 Simulating the Model without Shocks
Figures 5 and 6 report the results from simulating the model with the pa-
rameter values obtained in the previous section in the absence of shocks. For
this simulation, we set π = .005, δ = .554 and φ =1 /2. These parameter
values will be discussed further in the next section; for the moment, just
take them as an example.
Figure 5 reports average annual growth rates for the data on population
(the circles) as well as the model’s simulated growth rates for population
and per capita consumption. Figure 6 displays the level of population and
the level of per capita consumption, both in the simulation and for the data.
These ﬁgures illustrate that the internal dynamics of the model are able
to replicate broadly the patterns observed in the data. The simulation ex-
hibits thousands of years of very slow growth, followed by a sharp rise around
the time of the Industrial Revolution. In levels, the model systematically
overpredicts the level of population but does an excellent job of matching
the data on per capita consumption. In particular, the level of consump-Growth Over the Very Long Run 27
Figure 5: An Industrial Revolution
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Note: The circles denote the average annual rates of population growth reported in Table 1.
tion is stable for thousands of years before rising sharply with the Industrial
Revolution.
The future predictions of the model are interesting even if they should
not be taken seriously. With ¯ b = ¯ d = 0, the long run growth rate of the
model is zero. Population growth falls to zero after the Industrial Revolu-
tion, as the rise in consumption generates a demographic transition. Con-
sumption growth falls to zero gradually, but only after the level of per capita
consumption is well on its way toward inﬁnity.
5 Adding Shocks to the Model
In the absence of shocks, there exist values of π, φ,a n dδ that ﬁt the broad
patterns of the history of world population and per capita consumption.
However, this simple model overpredicts the level of population systemat-
ically, and one may wonder where these parameter values come from. InGrowth Over the Very Long Run 28
Figure 6: Population and Per Capita Consumption
−25000 −10000 0      5000  
5     
25    
100   
















−25000 −10000 0      5000  
250    
1000   



















Note: The circles in the left ﬁgure denote the population growth rates in Table 1. The
circles in the right panel are levels of per capita GDPfrom Maddison (1995) for 1500,
1820, 1900, and 1990.
this section, we add shocks to property rights and productivity so that the
model ﬁts the population data exactly. In the process, some useful ﬁndings
will be uncovered.
The solution proceeds as follows. We solve for a sequence of shocks to
property rights πt and productivity shocks  t, so that the model’s simu-
lated levels of population exactly match the actual levels. Both shocks are
assumed to be constant during the entire interval between successive obser-
vations on the level of population (recall that a period is only 25 years and
that we therefore observe the level of population infrequently). If a positive
shock to property rights works, we shut oﬀ the productivity shock for that
interval (  = 1). On the other hand, if the level of population declines or
grows very slowly, it is possible that even a constant stock of ideas will over-
predict the subsequent level of population. In this case, we set the property
rights shock equal to zero to produce the constant stock of ideas over the
interval. We then ﬁnd the value of  <1 such that the subsequent level
of population is matched exactly. The solution method is provided in more
detail in the appendix.Growth Over the Very Long Run 29
Ideally, one would of course like to allow for a richer speciﬁcation for
the shocks — for example, by allowing for productivity shocks even when
the shock to property rights is positive. Given the limited nature of the
data, however, it does not seem possible to identify the shocks in such a
speciﬁcation.8
Finally, the value of π in the 20th century is set equal to 0.05; some
assumption like this is needed to pin down the value of δ. This value implies
that the world economy in the 20th century spends roughly ﬁve percent of
its output to compensate inventors and roughly ﬁve percent of its labor force
works to produce new ideas. Ratios of R&D to GDP in advanced countries
are around three percent, but the deﬁnition of R&D implicit in this statistic
is much narrower than the notion of ideas in the growth literature. In any
case, the nature of the results is not particularly sensitive to this parameter
value.
Solving the model in this fashion, given the population data in Table 1,
leads to the sequence of property rights shocks graphed in Figure 7. The
model is solved for four diﬀerent values of φ, reﬂecting our uncertainty about
this parameter value.
Regardless of the value of φ, each sequence yields the result that the
value of the property rights shock in the 20th century is signiﬁcantly higher
than in the preceding thousand years. However, the diﬀerent values of φ
indicate very diﬀerent levels of property rights over longer time spans. In
particular, for large values of φ, the model suggests that around 5000 B.C.,
as much as ﬁve percent of output may have been devoted to compensate
inventive eﬀort, a level not reached again until the 20th century. Given
what we know about the history of property rights, this seems implausibly
high. Based on the results displayed in Figure 7, we will choose a value of
8It is possible to view the general procedure for estimating the shocks from a more
formal econometric standpoint. Each πt and  t can be thought of as a parameter to
be estimated, together with µ, γ,a n dη. The discussion in the text explains how these
parameters are estimated. Note that the number of parameters and data points is roughly
t h es a m ei nt h i se x e r c i s e .Growth Over the Very Long Run 30
Figure 7: Shocks to Property Rights for Diﬀerent Values of φ
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Note: The ﬁgure plots the sequence of property rights shocks πt needed to match the
population data for four diﬀerent values of φ. For each series, the value of π1900 is set
equal to 0.05. To make the ﬁgure easier to read, periods when the property rights shocks
are zero are ignored; see Table 7 for exact values. Also, the shocks for the years -25000
and -10000 are plotted at the years -8000 and -7000, respectively.
φ =1 /2 in the simulations that follow.9 For most of the results that follow
— the exception being the model’s predictions for the future — the results
are almost completely insensitive to the value of φ (in this range).
Table 7 reports the actual values of πt and  t that are needed to ﬁt
the population data exactly. Each type of shock will be discussed in turn.
Several remarks concerning the evolution of property rights are in order.
First, with φ =1 /2, the values of πt suggest that property rights have
been getting better on average over the 25,000 year period. Just how much
better can be seen in Table 8, which constructs some averages across several
9The corresponding value of δ that leads to a value of π = .05 in the 20th century is
3.9923.Growth Over the Very Long Run 31
Table 7: Shocks: πt and  t
Year Nt πt  t
-25000 3.34 0.00003 1
-10000 4 0.00017 1
-5000 5 0.00367 1
-4000 7 0.00460 1
-3000 14 0.00140 1
-2000 27 0.00114 1
-1000 50 0.00472 1
-500 100 0 0.972
-200 150 0 0.957
0 170 0 0.986
200 190 0 0.929
400 190 0 0.971
600 200 0.00040 1
800 220 0.00174 1
1000 265 0.00707 1
1100 320 0 0.820
1200 360 0 0.712
1300 360 0 0.681
1400 350 0 0.946
1500 425 0.00442 1
1600 545 0 0.773
1700 610 0.00875 1
1800 900 0.00402 1
1900 1625 0.05000 1
2000 5333 ... ...
Note: These shocks are computed for
the case of φ =1 /2a n dδ =3 .99232.Growth Over the Very Long Run 32











-25000 to -10000 1.0 1.0 1.0 1
-10000 to -5000 3.5 1.1 1.0 4
-5000 to 0 26.9 1.4 1.1 39
0 to 1000 6.9 19.1 2.0 267
1000 to 1500 16.9 26.7 2.3 1027
1500 to 1900 38.8 38.2 2.6 3834
1900 to 2000 244.7 107.8 4.2 110467
Note: All series are normalized to one in the ﬁrst interval. π
λ
t
is computed as the average value of π over the interval (using





calculated using the population and stock of ideas at the start
of the interval.
intervals.
According to the table, the number of ideas produced per year increased
more than 110,000 times between the beginning of the simulation in 25,000
B.C. and the 20th century. A factor of 108 of this increase is due to the fact
that there is a larger population available upon which to draw: more people
produce more ideas. Interestingly, even with φ =1 /2, only a factor of about
4 of this increase is associated with the rise in knowledge spillovers. Previous
discoveries raise the productivity of research in the future, but this eﬀect
is estimated to be fairly small prior to the 20th century. The remaining
factor of 245 is attributed to improvements in property rights. That is,
the main force responsible for the technological advances that have made
possible modern standards of living is the fact that the fraction of output
devoted to compensating inventive eﬀort has risen substantially. This eﬀect
is particularly acute when the 20th century is compared to the preceding
several hundred years. Prior to 1900, increases in population and propertyGrowth Over the Very Long Run 33
rights were roughly of equal importance in contributing to the production of
ideas. It is in the 20th century that the increase in property rights becomes
dominant.
This aspect of the simulation seems to be supported by historical ev-
idence. The development of property rights throughout the world, both
for intellectual property and more generally, has surely raised the proﬁts
available to entrepreneurs, luring an increasing fraction of the population to
search for new ideas.
The general rise in property rights occurs against a backdrop of ﬂuctu-
ations. According to the results, between the years 5000 B.C. and 1 A.D.,
the world population was especially active in generating ideas. The average
value of πt reaches a local peak during this interval at just under 1/2 of
one percent, a level that is not exceeded systematically until recent times.
Historically, this period marked the emergence of civilization in the form of
cities. Key technological developments included writing, the beginning of
scientiﬁc observation, the widespread use of metals, and dramatic improve-
ments in transportation capabilities through the construction of ships and
wagons. Whether or not these discoveries can be related to an improve-
ment in the ability of entrepreneurs to earn returns is an open question
that could be explored. This pattern ﬁts with a view that the world during
the ascendency of the Mesopotamian, Egyptian, and Greek civilizations was
more productive at generating ideas than during the middle ages prior to
the Enlightenment.
The productivity shocks may also be analyzed in this fashion. These
shocks are shown in the last column of Table 7 and play the following role.
The basic model contains forces that, at least until the demographic tran-
sition occurs, imply an ever increasing rate of population growth. In the
data, in contrast, there are a number of periods during which population
growth falls or even becomes negative. To account for these periods, we
reduce productivity, which in turn reduces fertility and raises mortality.10
10The most obvious place where such shocks are required is between the years 1100 andGrowth Over the Very Long Run 34
Figure 8: Population (Actual and Simulated) and Consumption
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Note: The circles in the ﬁgure denote the data on population growth rates from Table 1.
The lines denote simulated values.
5.1 Simulation Results
With these shocks, our simulated economy is able to reproduce exactly the
time series for world population. Figure 8 displays the actual and simulated
data for population growth and consumption growth for the case of φ =
1/2. After the year 2000, it is assumed that the property rights variable πt
remains constant at its 20th century value and that no productivity shocks
hit the economy. Summary statistics for this experiment are reported in
1400, where the model requires the economy to run at only 3/4 of its full productivity
potential. Signiﬁcant shocks during this period include the genocidal Mongol invasions
under Genghis Khan and his successors (in which perhaps a third of the population of
China died) and the Black Death in Europe of the mid-14th century, which killed between
a quarter and a third of the European population. The model also requires a surprisingly
large productivity shock during the 17th century, in which productivity runs at only
79 percent. Notable shocks in this period include the Thirty Years’ War in Europe,
the Manchu conquest in China, and the continuation of the mass annihilation of Native
Americans, particularly in Central and South America.Growth Over the Very Long Run 35
Table 9: Simulation Results
Average Average
Year AN Growth c Growth
-25000 648 3.34 ... 270 ...
-10000 690 4 0.00001 271 0.00000
-5000 747 5 0.00004 272 0.00000
-500 2686 100 0.00067 352 0.00006
0 2686 170 0.00106 298 -0.00033
1000 3371 265 0.00044 326 0.00009
1500 4335 425 0.00094 360 0.00020
1600 5450 545 0.00249 322 -0.00111
1700 5450 610 0.00113 402 0.00221
1800 8429 900 0.00389 559 0.00329
1900 11366 1625 0.00591 603 0.00076
2000 74446 5333 0.01188 3116 0.01643
2100 831051 25778 0.01576 25855 0.02116
2200 6203610 28065 0.00085 197275 0.02032
2300 7554072 27471 -0.00021 562216 0.01047
Note: Simulation results assuming φ =1 /2.
Table 9.
That the simulation ﬁts the population data exactly is in one sense not
surprising — the shocks were chosen exactly for this purpose. What is
r e m a r k a bl e ,h o w e v e r ,i st h a tt h i sﬁ ti sa c h i e v e dw i t hs h o c k st h a ta p p e a r
reasonable given the historical record. For comparison, imagine the shocks
that would be required for a standard neoclassical growth model to ﬁt these
same facts.
Two additional features of Figure 8 are worth noting. First, the time
path of consumption growth broadly matches that outlined in our “facts”
section: per capita consumption growth is quite close to zero until recent
years, at which point it spikes up to nearly three percent per year. Second,
regarding the future of population growth and consumption growth, both
peak sometime shortly after the year 2000 and then decline, eventually toGrowth Over the Very Long Run 36
Figure 9: Population and Per Capita Consumption
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Note: The circles denote data; the lines represent simulated values.
zero since we have assumed that ¯ b = ¯ d =0 .
The simulation results in Table 9 show that the level of per capita con-
sumption rises slightly from 25000 B.C. until the year 0. In contrast, the
level of population rises from 3.34 million to 170 million, a 50-fold increase.
This is the long-run Malthusian consequence of the improvements in tech-
nology shown in the ﬁrst column.
The levels of population and consumption are shown in Figure 9. The
apparent constancy of consumption for most of history suggested in the
ﬁgure is an artifact of the time scale. Figure 10 plots the level of per capita
consumption from 1000 B.C. until 1800 A.D. to illustrate this point. From
an average level of $270 throughout most of time, per capita consumption
rises to $300 in 1000 B.C. and reaches a local peak of about $352 in 500
B.C. before falling back to $298 by year 0. Reasonably large swings in
consumption similar to this one continue through the year 1800, reﬂecting
the impact of shocks to property rights and to productivity.
These ﬂuctuations raise an interesting possibility. It has long been noted
that several civilizations such as ancient Rome or China in the centuries fol-
lowing the previous millennium have witnessed spurts of growth and techno-Growth Over the Very Long Run 37
Figure 10: Per Capita Consumption: 1000 B.C. to 1800 A.D.






















logical progress, only to succumbeventually to the end of per capita growth
and even a decline in standards of living. How is this possible, and why has
this fate been avoided in more recent times?
The model provides one possible explanation, consistent with the dis-
cussions of North and Thomas (1973), Jones (1988), Rosenberg and Birdzell
(1986), Baumol (1990), and Mokyr (1990). The establishment of institu-
tions that encourage the discovery and widespread use of new ideas can
lead societies to outstrip Malthusian forces. However, the removal of these
same institutions can allow the Malthusian forces to once again become
dominant. The technological frontier must be constantly pushed forward
in order to avoid the specter of diminishing returns associated with ﬁxed
resources. The history of “growth recurring,” to use the evocative phrase of
Eric Jones, may reﬂect the establishment and then elimination of property
rights in various civilizations.11
11To examine this hypothesis more formally, the analysis in this paper would need to beGrowth Over the Very Long Run 38
Have we broken from this cycle? It is impossible to know, of course.
However, the model suggests one insight related to this question. With small
populations, an improvement in property rights has a small eﬀect on rates
of discovery and therefore on standards of living: the number of new ideas
created depends on the size of the population. The presence in recent times
of a large world economy makes property rights themselves more valuable.
The cumulative eﬀect of thousands of years of discoveries has been to raise
the world population to levels at which the establishment of property rights
could lead to large and rapid improvements in technology and standards of
living.
Returning to the broader pattern of population and consumption dis-
played in Figure 9, one sees a rapid rise in consumption around the year
2000, leading to the onset of the fertility transition. World population sta-
bilizes at slightly more than 25 billion around the year 2100.12
These patterns of population and consumption growth can be seen more
clearly in Figure 11, which focuses in on a 600 year period beginning with
the 20th century. Population growth peaks in the year 2025, coming much
closer to the actual peak in world population growth that seems to have
occurred during the 1960s. Consumption growth peaks at more than 2.5
percent around the year 2125. Recall that world per capita GDP growth
seemed to peak in the 1960s at around 3 percent per year. While the timing
of the peak is oﬀ (by more than a century), the magnitude is about right
for φ =1 /2.
6 Was the Industrial Revolution Inevitable?
A sensible working deﬁnition of an industrial revolution for this model is a
substantial and rapid rise in both the level and growth rate of per capita
extended to consider a world of separate regions and the diﬀusion of ideas among those
regions.
12These values are quite sensitive to the value of φ. For example, with φ =0 ,c o n s u m p -
tion rises more gradually, delaying the onset of the decline in fertility. As a result, world
population grows (implausibly) to more than 250 billion before stabilizing!Growth Over the Very Long Run 39
Figure 11: Growth: The 20th Century and Beyond







































Note: The circles in the ﬁgure denote the data on population growth rates from Kremer
(1993). The lines denote simulated values.
consumption accompanied by a rise in population growth and followed by a
demographic transition. Based on this deﬁnition, the model suggests that
an industrial revolution was indeed inevitable, at least for the parameter
values under consideration. This was apparent in Figure 5.
But was the Industrial Revolution inevitable? If by the Industrial Revo-
lution we mean the onset of rapid population and per capita growth culmi-
nating in the large increases in standards of living during the 20th century,
then the answer turns out to be no.
To see this, consider the following counterfactual experiment. Suppose
the large improvement in property rights in the 20th century had never hap-
pened. Speciﬁcally, suppose πt remained at its 19th century value forever.
The simulation results for this case are reported in Figure 12. What we
see from this experiment is that an industrial revolution does indeed occur,Growth Over the Very Long Run 40
Figure 12: Growth and Consumption: No 20th Century Shock
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Note: The circles denote data from Kremer (1993) and Maddison (1995). The lines denote
simulated values.
but it is delayed by more than 300 years. The improvement in property
rights in the 20th century therefore played a critical role in the timing of
the Industrial Revolution, at least in the simulation.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides a model of growth over the very long run in which the
basic story goes something like the following. A long time ago, the world
population was relatively small and the productivity of this population at
producing ideas was relatively low, in part because of the absence of in-
stitutions such as property rights. For example, in the year 25000 B.C.,
the model suggests that it took several hundred years before the society of
3.34 million people produced a single new idea. Once this idea was discov-
ered however, consumption and fertility rose, producing a rise in population
growth, so that there were more people available to ﬁnd new ideas, and the
next new idea was discovered more quickly. In the model, this feedback
leads to accelerating rates of population growth and consumption growth
provided the aggregate production technology is characterized by increasingGrowth Over the Very Long Run 41
returns to accumulable factors.
In the absence of shocks, this general feedback seems capable of produc-
ing something like an industrial revolution. However, the quantitative anal-
ysis suggests that changes in institutions to support innovation have been
extremely important. The rise and decline of institutions such as property
rights could be responsible for the rise and decline of great civilizations in
the past. And the establishment of innovation-promoting institutions in the
20th century appears to have played a critical role in generating the observed
Industrial Revolution.
In the simulated economy, the resulting technological progress and rise
in per capita consumption lead to a reduction in mortality followed by a
reduction in fertility as the demographic transition sets in. In the very long-
run, it is possible for the level of the population to stabilize while the level
of consumption grows to inﬁnity, albeit at a growth rate that gradually falls
to zero.Growth Over the Very Long Run 42
8 Appendix
8.1 Existence and Uniqueness of the Static Equilibrium
Proof:
The ﬁrst order condition in equation (13) can be combined with the two
constraints in (3) and (4) to yield an implicit labor supply function  (w):
	





(wt t − ¯ c)γ
wt
. (25)
The wage is determined by the production function for consumption
goods. Rewriting equation (10) with LYt=( 1− πt) tNt and recalling that










Equations (25) and (26) can be combined to get a single nonlinear equa-
tion that characterizes the equilibrium value of  t. Dropping the time sub-
scripts, deﬁne





(a β − ¯ c)γ 1−β.
Then the equilibrium satisﬁes F( ∗)=0 .
To see that there is a unique solution to this equation, ﬁrst note that the
Inada-type conditions on the utility function guarantee that a solution, if it
exists, must satisfy ˜ c>0a n d˜ b>0. In terms of  , these conditions imply
that  >(¯ c/a)1/β and  <1−¯ b/α. Therefore, we require (¯ c/a)1/β < 1−¯ b/α in
order for a solution to exist. Given the deﬁnition of a, this puts restrictions
on initial conditions.
Next, notice that F(¯ c/a) > 0a n dF(1 − ¯ b/α) < 0. Therefore, provided
F( ) is monotonically decreasing within this range, the solution is unique.
The condition that F ( ) < 0f o r( ¯ c/a)1/β < <1 − ¯ b/α is readily veriﬁed.
Once  ∗(a) is determined, the remaining quantities in the proposition are
given in a straightforward fashion from equations (26), (3), and (4). Q.E.D.Growth Over the Very Long Run 43
8.2 Transition Dynamics
In the body of the paper, we consider transition dynamics when the pro-
duction function for new ideas depends on πNt instead of on πLt. We show
in this section the sense in which this approximation is valid.
Deﬁne xo










λ (1 + n(at))λ
(1 + xt)1−φ . (27)
The state variable at+1 depends on xo
t and at,a si nS e c t i o n3 . 3 .
The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of (27) is the only diﬀerence relative
to the analysis in the Section 3.3. When we are close to the point where
 (a) achieves its minimum value (see Figure 1), this term is approximately
one, so that the analysis is approximately that in Section 3.3. Similarly, as
a gets large,  (a)c o n v e r g e st o1− ¯ b/α, so that this term approaches one,
and the analysis is exactly that given in Section 3.3. In between,  (a)i sa n
increasing function so that this term is greater than one. This implies that
the ∆x = 0 schedule is twisted upward slightly, which does not qualitatively
alter the analysis.
8.3 Solving for πt and  t
Given the parameter values in Tables 2, 4, and 6, and given the population
data in Table 1, we solve for the sequence of property rights shocks {πt} and
productivity shocks { t} where t = 0 corresponds to the year 25000 B.C.,
and each unit increment to t corresponds to an increment of 25 years. The
solution is obtained as follows:
1. We begin with an initial population, an initial stock of ideas, and
an observation for population some periods later. Let NumPeriods
denote the number of periods between the two observations on popu-
lation. For example, if the ﬁrst period corresponds to the observation
in the year -2000 and the next is the year -1000, we have 1000/25+1
= 41 periods.Growth Over the Very Long Run 44
2. Solve for the constant value of the shock π such that the dynamics
of the model would lead population to grow from its level at the ﬁrst
observation to its level at the second observation after NumPeriod
periods, with a percentage error less than or equal to 10−8.I fs u c ha
value is found and is “small” in the sense that it does not involve pass-
ing through the entire demographic transition in one period, then we’re
done with this step. Set the productivity shock for period NumPeriod
equal to one since it is not needed.
3. With respect to the previous step, there are two things to note. First,
there are occasionally multiple values of the π shock that will work.
We choose the smallest value (so that we are on the pre-demographic
transition side of the population growth schedule as much as possi-
ble). Second, for declines in the level of population, or for relatively
small increases, it is possible that no “small” shock will work. In this
case, set the property rights shock for the periods corresponding to
1:( NumPeriods − 1) equal to zero, and solve for the reduction in
productivity — the constant value of  <1 — such that the simula-
tion matches the level of population after NumPeriod periods, with
a percentage error less than or equal to 10−8.
4. Advance to the next population observation and repeat this process,
starting with step 1 above, until all population observations have been
ﬁt by the model.Growth Over the Very Long Run 45
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